Struct webpki::EndEntityCert

pub struct EndEntityCert<'a> { /* private fields */ }

An end-entity certificate.

Server certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of several steps. All of these steps are necessary:

• EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert: Verify that the server’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS server.
• EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_dns_name: Verify that the server’s certificate is valid for the host that is being connected to.
• EndEntityCert.verify_signature: Verify that the signature of server’s ServerKeyExchange message is valid for the server’s certificate.

Client certificate processing in a TLS connection consists of analogous steps. All of these steps are necessary:

• EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert: Verify that the client’s certificate is currently valid for use by a TLS client.
• EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_dns_name or EndEntityCert.verify_is_valid_for_at_least_one_dns_name: Verify that the client’s certificate is valid for the identity or identities used to identify the client. (Currently client authentication only works when the client is identified by one or more DNS hostnames.)
• EndEntityCert.verify_signature: Verify that the client’s signature in its CertificateVerify message is valid using the public key from the client’s certificate.

Although it would be less error-prone to combine all these steps into a single function call, some significant optimizations are possible if the three steps are processed separately (in parallel). It does not matter much which order the steps are done in, but all of these steps must completed before application data is sent and before received application data is processed. EndEntityCert::from is an inexpensive operation and is deterministic, so if these tasks are done in multiple threads, it is probably best to just call EndEntityCert::from multiple times (before each operation) for the same DER-encoded ASN.1 certificate bytes.

Implementations

impl<'a> EndEntityCert<'a>

pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_server_cert(
    &self,
    supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
    TlsServerTrustAnchors: &TlsServerTrustAnchors<'_>,
    intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
    time: Time
) -> Result<(), Error>

Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use by a TLS server.

supported_sig_algs is the list of signature algorithms that are trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s public key is not validated against this list. trust_anchors is the list of root CAs to trust. intermediate_certs is the sequence of intermediate certificates that the server sent in the TLS handshake. time is the time for which the validation is effective (usually the current time).

pub fn verify_is_valid_tls_client_cert(
    &self,
    supported_sig_algs: &[&SignatureAlgorithm],
    TlsClientTrustAnchors: &TlsClientTrustAnchors<'_>,
    intermediate_certs: &[&[u8]],
    time: Time
) -> Result<(), Error>

Verifies that the end-entity certificate is valid for use by a TLS client.

If the certificate is not valid for any of the given names then this fails with Error::CertNotValidForName.

supported_sig_algs is the list of signature algorithms that are trusted for use in certificate signatures; the end-entity certificate’s public key is not validated against this list. trust_anchors is the list of root CAs to trust. intermediate_certs is the sequence of intermediate certificates that the client sent in the TLS handshake. cert is the purported end-entity certificate of the client. time is the time for which the validation is effective (usually the current time).

pub fn verify_is_valid_for_dns_name(
    &self,
    dns_name: DnsNameRef<'_>
) -> Result<(), Error>

Verifies that the certificate is valid for the given DNS host name.

pub fn verify_is_valid_for_at_least_one_dns_name<'names, Names>(
    &self,
    dns_names: Names
) -> Result<Vec<DnsNameRef<'names>>, Error>where
    Names: Iterator<Item = DnsNameRef<'names>>,

Verifies that the certificate is valid for at least one of the given DNS host names.

If the certificate is not valid for any of the given names then this fails with Error::CertNotValidForName. Otherwise the DNS names for which the certificate is valid are returned.

Requires the alloc default feature; i.e. this isn’t available in #![no_std] configurations.

pub fn verify_signature(
    &self,
    signature_alg: &SignatureAlgorithm,
    msg: &[u8],
    signature: &[u8]
) -> Result<(), Error>

Verifies the signature signature of message msg using the certificate’s public key.

signature_alg is the algorithm to use to verify the signature; the certificate’s public key is verified to be compatible with this algorithm.

For TLS 1.2, signature corresponds to TLS’s DigitallySigned.signature and signature_alg corresponds to TLS’s DigitallySigned.algorithm of TLS type SignatureAndHashAlgorithm. In TLS 1.2 a single SignatureAndHashAlgorithm may map to multiple SignatureAlgorithms. For example, a TLS 1.2 ignatureAndHashAlgorithm of (ECDSA, SHA-256) may map to any or all of {ECDSA_P256_SHA256, ECDSA_P384_SHA256}, depending on how the TLS implementation is configured.

For current TLS 1.3 drafts, signature_alg corresponds to TLS’s algorithm fields of type SignatureScheme. There is (currently) a one-to-one correspondence between TLS 1.3’s SignatureScheme and SignatureAlgorithm.

Trait Implementations

impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a [u8]> for EndEntityCert<'a>

fn try_from(cert_der: &'a [u8]) -> Result<Self, Self::Error>

Parse the ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 encoding of the certificate cert_der.

type Error = Error

The type returned in the event of a conversion error.